RATS M. Ounsworth Internet-Draft R. Kettlewell Intended status: Standards Track Entrust Expires: 3 August 2025 J. P. Fiset Crypto4A H. Tschofenig H-BRS T. Reddy Nokia M. Wiseman Beyond Identity 30 January 2025 DER Web Token draft-ounsworth-rats-dwt-latest Abstract An Attestation Token provides a set of claims that describe the state and characteristics of an entity, such as a hardware security module, smartphone, IoT device, or network equipment. This claims set allows a relying party to assess the type and degree of trust it can place in the entity. This document utilizes the claims defined for the Entity Attestation Token (EAT) and defines them in ASN.1 format and supports their encoding using Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER). EAT specified claims for use with both the CBOR Web Token (CWT) and the JSON Web Token (JWT). This new structure, referred to as the DER Web Token (DWT), is generated by an Attester as part of remote attestation procedures and serves as Evidence. The document adheres to the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture, where Evidence is transmitted by an Attester and subsequently processed by a Verifier. Status of This Memo This Internet-Draft is submitted in full conformance with the provisions of BCP 78 and BCP 79. Internet-Drafts are working documents of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). Note that other groups may also distribute working documents as Internet-Drafts. The list of current Internet- Drafts is at https://datatracker.ietf.org/drafts/current/. Internet-Drafts are draft documents valid for a maximum of six months and may be updated, replaced, or obsoleted by other documents at any time. It is inappropriate to use Internet-Drafts as reference material or to cite them other than as "work in progress." This Internet-Draft will expire on 3 August 2025. Copyright Notice Copyright (c) 2025 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the document authors. All rights reserved. This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents (https://trustee.ietf.org/ license-info) in effect on the date of publication of this document. Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must include Revised BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as described in the Revised BSD License. Table of Contents 1. Introduction 2. Conventions and Definitions 3. Use Cases 4. Attestation Evidence 5. Signing and Verification Procedure 5.1. Signing Procedure 5.2. Verification Procedure 6. Claims 6.1. Nonce 6.2. Device Identifier 6.2.1. ueid (Universal Entity ID) Claim 6.2.2. sueids (Semi-permanent UEIDs) Claim (SUEIDs) 6.2.3. oemid (Hardware OEM Identification) Claim 6.2.4. hwmodel (Hardware Model) Claim 6.2.5. hwversion (Hardware Version) Claim 6.3. Software Identifier 6.4. OEM Boot 6.5. Dbgstat (Debug Status) 6.6. Location 6.7. Uptime 6.8. Bootcount 6.9. Bootseed 6.10. dloas (Digital Letters of Approval) 6.11. Manifests 6.12. Measurements 6.13. Measres (Software Measurement Results) 6.14. Submods (Submodules) 6.15. iat (Issuance Time) 6.16. Profile (Submodules) 6.17. intuse (Intended Use) 6.18. Extensibility 7. Security Considerations 8. IANA Considerations 9. References 9.1. Normative References 9.2. Informative References Appendix A. Acknowledgements Appendix B. ASN.1 Module Authors' Addresses 1. Introduction Trusted execution environments, such as secure elements and hardware security modules (HSMs), have become widely used for providing a secure environment to house cryptographic key material and security- sensitive code. These environments support functions like signing and decryption services, secure boot, secure storage, and other critical security operations. Typically, these security functions are accessed through a narrow and well-defined interface and are used by operating system libraries and applications. Increasingly, entities relying on these secure elements seek evidence that security-sensitive operations are truly being executed within a secure environment. This evidence may pertain to the secure element platform itself or to the storage and protection of cryptographic keys, or both. Such evidence is commonly referred to as remote attestation and is covered by the Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) architecture [RFC9344]. This document specifies an evidence data format defined in ASN.1 [X.680], leveraging many data structures from the PKIX ASN.1 modules [RFC5912]. This approach offers a convenient format for secure elements and verifiers, particularly those designed for use within X.509 Public Key Infrastructures. This specification re-uses the claims defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat], describes them in ASN.1, and serializes them in DER format. While the encoding of these claims differs from what is defined in [I-D.ietf-rats-eat], their semantics remain unchanged. This specification does not constitute an EAP profile, as described in Section 6 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. 2. Conventions and Definitions The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. This document re-uses the terms defined in [RFC9334] related to remote attestation. Readers of this document are assumed to be familiar with the following terms: Evidence, Claim, Attestation Result, Attester, Verifier, and Relying Party. 3. Use Cases This specification was designed to meet the requirements published by the CA Browser Forum to convey properties about hardware security models, such as non-exportability, which must be enabled for storing publicly-trusted code-signing keys. There are, however, other use cases where remote attestation may also be used, such as * A Certification Authority receives a certificate signing request and wishes to verify that the subject public key was generated in an HSM (for example to satisfy CA/B Forum subscriber private key verification requirement). They may also wish to verify that the operations the HSM will allow for the corresponding private key are consistent with the purpose of the requested certificate. * A user of a Cloud Service Provider's 'Bring Your Own Key' service wishes to transfer their locally-generated key securely to the CSP's service by encrypting it under the CSP's public key. As part of their due diligence on the CSP's key they wish to verify (1) that it was generated by an HSM and (2) may only be used to unwrap the key into an HSM (i.e. unwrap permission but not decrypt permission). * An auditor of an identity provision service (or a competent end user) may wish to verify that keys representing end-user identities are held in an HSM and have permissions that are in line with the applicable regulations. For example, they may wish verify that the protection arrangements for assigned keys cannot be changed. * A manufacturer needs to provision configuration info, software, and credentials to a device from remote. With the help of remote attestation the manufacturer is provided enough information to verify that information is only sent to devices it has built. * Two HSM devices are establishing keys to perform secure exchange of information to establish a high availability cluster. As part of the establishment, an attestation message is sent between the devices to report on keys and policies. This allows the devices to confirm the origin of the keys and verify that policies are respected such a FIPS mode and other similar details. 4. Attestation Evidence This specification defines the following Evidence format, which contains a set of claims. To protect Evidence against modification, it is protected with a digital signature. PkixEvidenceStatement ::= SEQUENCE { tbsEvidence TBSEvidenceStatement signatureValues SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF BIT STRING, relatedCertificates [0] IMPLICIT SEQUENCE of Certificate OPTIONAL -- As defined in RFC 5280 } TBSEvidenceStatement ::= SEQUENCE { version INTEGER, claims SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF EVIDENCE-CLAIM, signatureInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SignatureInfo } EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= TYPE-IDENTIFIER -- TYPE-IDENTIFIER definition from X.681 TYPE-IDENTIFIER ::= CLASS { &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE, &Type } WITH SYNTAX {&Type IDENTIFIED BY &id} SignatureInfo ::= SEQUENCE { signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier, sid [0] SignerIdentifier OPTIONAL } SignerIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { keyId [0] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, subjectKeyIdentifier [1] EXPLICIT SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, -- As defined in RFC 5280 certificate [2] EXPLICIT Certificate OPTIONAL, -- As defined in RFC 5280 certHash [3] EXPLICIT CertHash OPTIONAL } CertHash ::= SEQUENCE { hash AlgorithmIdentifier, value OCTET STRING } -- There is bound to already exist an ASN.1 structure -- for this somewhere. AlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE { algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER, parameters ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL } version MUST be set to 1. 5. Signing and Verification Procedure EDNOTE: Can we start our versions at some number to avoid versions that Crypto4A has already used? 5.1. Signing Procedure 1. The message to be signed is the TBSEvidenceStatement, including the SignatureInfo for each of the signatures to be performed. 2. Each signature is computed in parallel and placed into index of the signatureValues SEQUENCE that matches the position of the corresponding SignatureInfo in the signatureInfos sequence. The signer MUST produce one signature per signatureInfo, it MUST NOT omit signatures and MUST NOT produce a subset of the signatures listed in signatureInfos. 5.2. Verification Procedure 1. The message to be verified is the TBSEvidenceStatement. 2. For each signatureInfo, the corresponding verification public key and signature algorithm is found according to the information contained in the SignatureInfo for that signature and any accompanying certificates or key material. 3. For each signature, the message is verified using the value from the corresponding element of the signatureValue sequence. 4. The PkixEvidenceStatement SHOULD be considered valid if and only if all signatures are valid; i.e. multiple signatures are to be treated as an AND mode. This item is a recommendation and not a hard requirement since verification policy is of course at the discretion of the Verifier. EDNOTE: the major change here from the original Crypto4A QASM Attestation is that the original only includes the claims in the signature, whereas this includes everything, including the version, list of signature algorithms. This prevents possible attacks where those values are manipulated by attackers. We should debate whether the certificates should be protected by the signature. Pro: generally better for security to sign everything. Con: in some contexts, it may be difficult to have the certificates prior to signing, but that's ok because most evidence carrier formats also allow you to attach the signatures externally. 6. Claims Since no claims are marked as MANDATORY, the sequence 'claims' may be constituted of differing claims from one instance to the next. This is expected as each evidence statement may be providing information to support different use cases. Once an evidence statement is signed, the Attester is guaranteeing that all of the claims carried by the evidence statement are true. It is important to note that multiple claims in the sequence may have the same 'id'. Implementers should ensure that this case is handled by verifying logic. +==============+==================+===============+ | Claim | Value | Section | +==============+==================+===============+ | Nonce | OCTET STRING | Section 6.1 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Ueid | UTF8String | Section 6.2.1 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Sueid | UTF8String | Section 6.2.2 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Oemid | UTF8String | Section 6.2 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Hwmodel | UTF8String | Section 6.2 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Hwversion | UTF8String | Section 6.2 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Swname | UTF8String | Section 6.3 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Swversion | UTF8String | Section 6.3 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Oemboot | BOOLEAN | Section 6.4 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Location | ??? | Section 6.6 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Dbgstat | CHOICE | Section 6.5 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Uptime | INTEGER | Section 6.7 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Bootcount | INTEGER | Section 6.8 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Bootseed | BIT STRING | Section 6.9 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Dloas | SEQUENCE OF Dloa | Section 6.10 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Manifests | ?? | Section 6.11 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Measurements | ?? | Section 6.12 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Measres | ?? | Section 6.13 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Submods | ?? | Section 6.14 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Iat | Time | Section 6.15 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Profile | ?? | Section 6.16 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ | Intuse | ?? | Section 6.17 | +--------------+------------------+---------------+ Table 1 +==============+=====+=============+ | Claim | OID | Status | +==============+=====+=============+ | Nonce | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Ueid | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Sueid | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Oemid | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Hwmodel | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Hwversion | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Swname | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Swversion | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Oemboot | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Location | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Dbgstat | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Uptime | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Bootcount | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Bootseed | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Dloas | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Manifests | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Measurements | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Measres | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Submods | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Iat | TBD | RECOMMENDED | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Profile | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ | Intuse | TBD | OPTIONAL | +--------------+-----+-------------+ Table 2 6.1. Nonce The "nonce" claim is used to provide freshness. The Nonce claim is used to carry the challenge provided by the caller to demonstrate freshness of the generated token. The following constraints apply to the nonce-type: * The length must be reasonable as it may be processed by end entities with limited resources. Therefore, it is RECOMMENDED that the length does not exceed 64 bytes. * Only a single nonce value is conveyed. The nonce claim is defined as follows: Nonce EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= OCTET STRING IDENTIFIED BY TBD See Section 4.1 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim. 6.2. Device Identifier Devices assigned a Universal Entity ID compliant with RATS EAT SHOULD provide this in the Ueid or Sueid claim. Both MAY be provided. The set {OemID, Hwmodel, Hwversion}, when provided, SHOULD represent a universally unique identification of the device. Where applicable, {OemID, Hwmodel, Hwversion} SHOULD match the way the device is identified in relevant endorsements, such as published FIPS or Common Criteria certificates. 6.2.1. ueid (Universal Entity ID) Claim The "ueid" claim conveys a UEID, which identifies an individual manufactured entity. This identifier is a globally unique and permanent identifier. See Section 4.2.1 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim. Three types of UEIDs are defined, which are distinguished via a type field. The ueid claim is defined as follows: id-ce-evidence-ueid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD_evidence TBD_ueid } claim_ueid ::= SEQUENCE { type INTEGER ( RAND(1), EUI(2), IMEI(3),...), value OCTET STRING } 6.2.2. sueids (Semi-permanent UEIDs) Claim (SUEIDs) The "sueids" claim conveys one or more semi-permanent UEIDs (SUEIDs). An SUEID has the same format, characteristics and requirements as a UEID, but MAY change to a different value on entity life-cycle events while the ueid claim is permanent. An entity MAY have both a UEID and SUEIDs, neither, one or the other. There MAY be multiple SUEIDs and each has a text string label the purpose of which is to distinguish it from others. See Section 4.2.2 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim. The sueids claim is defined as follows: id-ce-evidence-sueids OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD_evidence TBD_sueids } claim_sueids ::= SEQUENCE { label OCTET STRING, type INTEGER ( RAND(1), EUI(2), IMEI(3),...), value OCTET STRING } 6.2.3. oemid (Hardware OEM Identification) Claim The "oemid" claim identifies the Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) of the hardware. See Section 4.2.3 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim. The value of this claim depends on the type of OEMID and three types of IDs are defined: * OEMIDs using a 128-bit random number. Section 4.2.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] defines this type. * an IEEE based OEMID using a global registry for MAC addresses and company IDs. Section 4.2.3.1 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] defines this type. * OEMIDs using Private Enterprise Numbers maintained by IANA. Section 4.2.3.3 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] defines this type. The oemid claim is defined as follows: id-ce-evidence-oemid OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD_evidence TBD_oemid } claim_oemid ::= SEQUENCE { type INTEGER ( PEN(1), IEEE(2), RANDOM(3),...), value OCTET STRING } Editor's Note: The value for the PEN is numeric. For the other two types it is a binary string. 6.2.4. hwmodel (Hardware Model) Claim The "hwmodel" claim differentiates hardware models, products and variants manufactured by a particular OEM, the one identified by OEM ID. It MUST be unique within a given OEM ID. The concatenation of the OEM ID and "hwmodel" give a global identifier of a particular product. The "hwmodel" claim MUST only be present if an "oemid" claim is present. See Section 4.2.4 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim. The hwmodel claim is defined as follows: id-ce-evidence-hwmodel OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD_evidence TBD_hwmodel } claim_hwmodel ::= OCTET STRING 6.2.5. hwversion (Hardware Version) Claim The "hwversion" claim is a text string the format of which is set by each manufacturer. A "hwversion" claim MUST only be present if a "hwmodel" claim is present. See Section 4.2.5 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim. The hwversion claim is defined as follows: id-ce-evidence-hwversion OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ce TBD_evidence TBD_hwwversion } hwversion ::= OCTET STRING 6.3. Software Identifier Swname EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.6 Swversion EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= UTF8String IDENTIFIED BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.7 SwName and Swversion together identify the device firmware and SHOULD match the way the firmware is identified in relevant endorsements, such as published FIPS or Common Criteria certificates. 6.4. OEM Boot Oemboot EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= BOOLEAN IDENTIFIED BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.8 6.5. Dbgstat (Debug Status) The "dbgstat" claim applies to entity-wide or submodule-wide debug facilities and diagnostic hardware built into chips. It applies to any software debug facilities related to privileged software that allows system-wide memory inspection, tracing or modification of non- system software like user mode applications. See Section 4.2.9 of [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] for a description of this claim and the semantic of the values in the enumerated list. The dbgstat claim is defined as follows: Dbgstat EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= CHOICE { enabled [0] IMPLICIT NULL, disabled [1] IMPLICIT NULL, disabled-Since-Boot [2] IMPLICIT NULL, disabled-Permanently [3] IMPLICIT NULL, disabled-Fully-and-Permanently [4] IMPLICIT NULL } -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.9 6.6. Location Location EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= ???? IDENTIFIED BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.10 Most HSMs will likely not know their own physical location, but cryptographic modules on mobile devices may. 6.7. Uptime The "uptime" claim contains the number of seconds that have elapsed since the entity or submodule was last booted. Uptime EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= INTEGER IDENTIFIED BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.11 6.8. Bootcount The "bootcount" claim contains a count of the number times the entity or submodule has been booted. Support for this claim requires a persistent storage on the device. Bootcount EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= INTEGER IDENTIFIER BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.12 6.9. Bootseed The "bootseed" claim contains a value created at system boot time that allows differentiation of attestation reports from different boot sessions of a particular entity (e.g., a certain UEID). This value is usually public. It is not a secret and MUST NOT be used for any purpose that a secret seed is needed, such as seeding a random number generator. Bootseed EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= BIT STRING IDENTIFIED BY TBD -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.13 6.10. dloas (Digital Letters of Approval) The "dloas" claim conveys one or more Digital Letters of Approval (DLOAs). A DLOA is a document that describes a certification that an entity has received. Examples of certifications represented by a DLOA include those issued by Global Platform and those based on Common Criteria. The DLOA is unspecific to any particular certification type or those issued by any particular organization. Dloas EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF Dloa Dloa ::= SEQUENCE IDENTIFIED BY TBD { dloaRegistrar IA5STRING, dloaPlatformLabel UTF8STRING, dloaApplicationLabal [0] IMPLICIT UTF8String OPTIONAL } -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.2.14 6.11. Manifests TODO -- rats-eat-4.2.15 6.12. Measurements TODO -- rats-eat-4.2.16 6.13. Measres (Software Measurement Results) TODO -- rats-eat-4.2.17 6.14. Submods (Submodules) TODO -- rats-eat-4.2.18 6.15. iat (Issuance Time) The time at which the evidence was created. Here we differ from the iat claim in rats-eat-4.3.1 in that we use the PKIX time format Time instead of the 64-bit CBOR time structure. Iat EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= Time It is recognized that many HSMs, especially if air-gapped, will not have an accurate system clock. If the system is not anticipated to have a reliable clock, then this claim SHOULD be omitted and the Nonce claim used instead. 6.16. Profile (Submodules) TODO -- rats-eat-4.3.2 6.17. intuse (Intended Use) Intuse EVIDENCE-CLAIM ::= CHOICE IDENTIFIED BY TBD { generic [1] IMPLICIT NULL, registration [2] IMPLICIT NULL, provisioning [3] IMPLICIT NULL, certificateIssuance [4] IMPLICIT NULL, proofOfPossession [5] IMPLICIT NULL } -- semantics defined in rats-eat-4.3.3 Note: tags intentionally started at 1 to align with EAT. If the IANA registry of intended use claims is extended, then the this CHOICE MAY be extended using the same tag values as indicated in the EAT registry. 6.18. Extensibility This document does not provide a comprehensive list of claims. New claims, including proprietary ones, may be introduced in the future. Therefore, parsers MUST be prepared to encounter and handle unrecognized claims gracefully. Generally, a verifier should begin with an appraisal policy outlining the specific claims to be evaluated, including any expected values. Any additional claims present in the evidence SHOULD be disregarded unless otherwise specified. 7. Security Considerations This specification re-uses the claims from the EAT specification and relies on the security protection offered by digital signatures. This digital signature is computed with the Attestation Key available on the device, see Section 12.1 of [RFC9334] for considerations regarding the generation, the use and the protection of these Attestation Keys. Since the Attester located at the end entity creates the Evidence with claims defined in this document. This document inherits the remote attestation architecture described in [RFC9334]. With the re-use of the claims from [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] the security and privacy considerations apply also to this document even though the encoding in this specification is different from the encoding of claims discussed by [I-D.ietf-rats-eat]. Evidence contains information that may be unique to a device and may therefore allow to single out an individual device for tracking purposes. Deployments that have privacy requirements must take appropriate measures to ensure that claim values can only identify a group of devices and that the Attestation Keys are used across a number of devices as well. To verify the Evidence, the primary need is to check the signature and the correct encoding of the claims. To produce the Attestation Result, the Verifier will use Endorsements, Reference Values, and Appraisal Policies. The policies may require that certain claims must be present and that their values match registered reference values. All claims may be worthy of additional appraisal. 8. IANA Considerations TBD: OIDs for all the claims listed in this document. 9. References 9.1. Normative References [I-D.ietf-rats-eat] Lundblade, L., Mandyam, G., O'Donoghue, J., and C. Wallace, "The Entity Attestation Token (EAT)", Work in Progress, Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-rats-eat-31, 6 September 2024, . [RFC2119] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels", BCP 14, RFC 2119, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, . [RFC8174] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words", BCP 14, RFC 8174, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, . [RFC9334] Birkholz, H., Thaler, D., Richardson, M., Smith, N., and W. Pan, "Remote ATtestation procedureS (RATS) Architecture", RFC 9334, DOI 10.17487/RFC9334, January 2023, . [X.680] ITU-T, "Information technology -- Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation", n.d., . 9.2. Informative References [RFC5912] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", RFC 5912, DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, . [RFC9344] Asaeda, H., Ooka, A., and X. Shao, "CCNinfo: Discovering Content and Network Information in Content-Centric Networks", RFC 9344, DOI 10.17487/RFC9344, February 2023, . Appendix A. Acknowledgements This specification is the work of a design team created by the chairs of the LAMPS working group. This specification has been developed based on discussions in that design team. The following persons, in no specific order, contributed to the work: Richard Kettlewell, Chris Trufan, Bruno Couillard, Jean-Pierre Fiset, Sander Temme, Jethro Beekman, Zsolt Rózsahegyi, Ferenc Pető, Mike Agrenius Kushner, Tomas Gustavsson, Dieter Bong, Christopher Meyer, Michael StJohns, Carl Wallace, Michael Ricardson, Tomofumi Okubo, Olivier Couillard, John Gray, Eric Amador, Johnson Darren, Herman Slatman, Tiru Reddy, Thomas Fossati, Corey Bonnell, Argenius Kushner, James Hagborg. Appendix B. ASN.1 Module TBD: Full ASN.1 goes in here. Authors' Addresses Mike Ounsworth Entrust Limited 2500 Solandt Road – Suite 100 Ottawa, Ontario K2K 3G5 Canada Email: mike.ounsworth@entrust.com Richard Kettlewell Entrust Limited United Kingdom Email: Richard.Kettlewell@entrust.com Jean-Pierre Fiset Crypto4A Technologies Inc. 1550A Laperriere Ave Ottawa, Ontario K1Z 7T2 Canada Email: jp@crypto4a.com Hannes Tschofenig University of Applied Sciences Bonn-Rhein-Siegx Email: Hannes.Tschofenig@gmx.net Tirumaleswar Reddy Nokia Bangalore Karnataka India Email: kondtir@gmail.com Monty Wiseman Beyond Identity United States of America Email: monty.wiseman@beyondidentity.com